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Abstract
We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a
public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard
to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic game abstraction, which conveniently allows
to represent the knowledge of the players about these deviations, and give a characterization of
Nash equilibria in terms of winning strategies in the abstraction. We then use the abstraction to
develop algorithms for some payoff functions.
1 Introduction
Multiplayer concurrent games over graphs allow to model rich interactions between players.
Those games are played as follows. In a state, each player chooses privately and independ-
ently an action, defining globally a move (one action per player); the next state of the game
is then defined as the successor (on the graph) of the current state using that move; players
continue playing from that new state, and form a(n infinite) play. Each player then gets
a reward given by a payoff function (one function per player). In particular, objectives of
the players may not be contradictory: those games are non-zero-sum games, contrary to
two-player games used for controller or reactive synthesis [30, 23].
The problem of distributed synthesis [25] can be formulated using multiplayer concurrent
games. In this setting, there is a global objective Φ, and one particular player called Nature.
The question then is whether the so-called grand coalition (all players except Nature) can
enforce Φ, whatever Nature does. While the players (except Nature) cooperate (and can
initially coordinate), their choice of actions (or strategy) can only depend on what they see
from the play so far. When modelling distributed synthesis as concurrent games, inform-
ation players receive is given via a partial observation function of the states of the game.
When the players have perfect monitoring of the play, the distributed synthesis problem
reduces to a standard two-player zero-sum game. Distributed synthesis is a fairly hot topic,
both using the formalization via concurrent games we have already described and using the
formalization via an architecture of processes [26]. The most general decidability results
in the concurrent game setting are under the assumption of hierarchical observation [36, 7]
(information received by the players is ordered) or more recently under recurring common
knowledge [6].
While distributed synthesis involves several players, this remains nevertheless a zero-
sum question. Using solution concepts borrowed from game theory, one can go a bit further
in describing the interactions between the players, and in particular in describing rational
behaviours of selfish players. One of the most basic solution concepts is that of Nash equi-
libria [24]. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile where no player can improve her payoff
by unilaterally changing her strategy. The outcome of a Nash equilibrium can therefore be
seen as a rational behaviour of the system. While very much studied by game theoretists
(e.g. over matrix games), such a concept (and variants thereof) has been only rather recently
studied over games on graphs. Probably the first works in that direction are [17, 15, 32, 33].
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2 Games on graphs with a public signal monitoring
Several series of works have followed. To roughly give an idea of the existing results, pure
Nash equilibria always exist in turn-based games for ω-regular objectives [35] but not in con-
current games; they can nevertheless be computed for large classes of objectives [35, 9, 11].
The problem becomes harder with mixed (that is, stochastic) Nash equilibria, for which we
often cannot decide the existence [34, 10].
Computing Nash equilibria requires to (i) find a good behaviour of the system; (ii) detect
deviations from that behaviour, and identify deviating players (called deviators); (iii) punish
them. This simple characterization of Nash equilibria is made explicit in [18]. Variants of
Nash equilibria require slightly different ingredients, but they are mostly of a similar vein.
In (almost) all these works though, perfect monitoring is implicitly assumed: in all cases,
players get full information on the states which are visited; a slight imperfect monitoring
is assumed in some works on concurrent games (like [9]), where actions which have been
selected are not made available to all the players (we speak of hidden actions). This can
yield some uncertainties for detecting deviators but not on states the game can be in, which
is rather limited and can actually be handled.
In this work, we integrate imperfect monitoring into the problem of deciding the existence
of pure Nash equilibria and computing witnesses. We choose to model imperfect monitoring
via the notion of signal, which, given a joint decision of the players together with the next
state the play will be in, gives some information to the players. To take further decisions,
players get information from the signals they received, and have perfect recall about the
past (their own actions and the signals they received). We believe this is a meaningful
framework. Let us give an example of a wireless network in which several devices try
to send data: each device can modulate its transmission power, in order to maximise its
bandwidth and reduce energy consumption as much as possible. However there might be
a degradation of the bandwidth due to other devices, and the satisfaction of each device is
measured as a compromise between energy consumption and allocated bandwidth, and is
given by a quantitative payoff function.1 In such a problem, it is natural to assume that
a device only gets a global information about the load of the network, and not about each
other device which is connected to the network. This can be expressed using imperfect
monitoring via public signals.
Following [31] in the framework of repeated matrix games, we put forward a notion of
public signal (inspired by [31]). A signal will be said public whenever it is common to
all players. That is, after each move, all the players get the same information (their own
action remains of course private). We will also distinguish several kinds of payoff functions,
depending on whether they are publicly visible (they only depend on the public signal), or
privately visible (they depend on the public signal and on private actions: the corresponding
player knows his payoff!), or invisible (players may not even be sure of their payoff).
The payoff functions we will focus on in this paper are Boolean ω-regular payoff functions
and mean payoff functions. Some of the decidability results can be extended in various
directions, which we will mention along the way.
As initial contributions of the paper, we show some undecidability results, and in partic-
ular that the hypothesis of public signal solely is not sufficient to enjoy all nice decidability
results: for mean payoff functions, which are privately visible, one cannot decide the con-
1 This can be expressed by payoffplayer i = Rpoweri
(
1 − e−0.5γi
)L
where γi is the signal-to-interference-
and-noise ratio for player i, R is the rate at which the wireless system transmits the information and
L is the size of the packets [29].
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strained existence of a Nash equilibrium. Constrained existence of a Nash equilibrium asks
for the existence of a Nash equilibrium whose payoff satisfies some given constraint.
The main contribution of the paper is the construction of a so-called epistemic game
abstraction. This abstraction is a two-player turn-based game in which we show that winning
strategies of one of the players (Eve) actually correspond to Nash equilibria in the original
game. The winning condition for Eve is rather complex, but can be simplified in the case
of publicly visible payoff functions. The epistemic game abstraction is inspired by both the
epistemic unfolding of [5] used for distributed synthesis, and the suspect game abstraction
of [9] used to compute Nash equilibria in concurrent games with hidden actions. In our
abstraction, we nevertheless not fully formalize epistemic unfoldings, and concentrate on
the structure of the knowledge which is useful under the assumption of public signals; we
show that several subset constructions (as done initially in [27], and since then used in
various occasions, see e.g. [14, 20, 19, 22]) made in parallel, are sufficient to represent the
knowledge of all the players. The framework of [9] happens to be a special case of the public
signal monitoring framework of the current paper. This construction can therefore be seen
as an extension of the suspect game abstraction.
This generic construction can be applied to several frameworks with publicly visible
payoff functions. We give two such applications, one with Boolean ω-regular payoff functions
and one with mean payoff functions.
Further Related Works.
We have already discussed several kinds of related works. Let us give some final remarks on
related works.
We have mentioned earlier that one of the problems for computing Nash equilibria is
to detect deviations and players who deviated. Somehow, the epistemic game abstraction
tracks the potential deviators, and even though players might not know who exactly is
responsible for the deviation (there might be several suspects), they can try to punish all
potential suspects. And that what we do here. Very recently, [8] discusses the detection
of deviators, and give some conditions for them to become common knowledge of the other
players. In our framework, even though deviators may not become fully common knowledge,
we can design mechanisms to punish the relevant ones.
Recently imperfect information has also been introduced in the setting of multi-agent
temporal logics [20, 21, 2, 3], and the main decidability results assume hierarchical inform-
ation. However, while those logics allow to express rich interactions, it can somehow only
consider qualitative properties. Furthermore, no tight complexity bounds are provided.
In [11], a deviator game abstraction is proposed. It twists the suspect game abstraction [9]
to allow for more general solution concepts (so-called robust equilibria), but it assumes
visibility of actions (hence remove any kind of uncertainties). Relying on results of [13], this
deviator game abstraction allows to compute equilibria with mean payoff functions. Our
algorithms for mean payoff functions will also rely on the polyhedron problem of [13].
2 Definitions
Throughout the paper, if S ⊆ R, we write S for S ∪ {−∞,+∞}.
4 Games on graphs with a public signal monitoring
2.1 Concurrent multiplayer games with signals
We consider the model of concurrent multi-player games, based on the two-player model
of [1]. This model of games was used for instance in [9]. We equip games with signals, which
will give information to the players.
I Definition 1. A concurrent game with signals is a tuple
G = 〈V, vinit, P ,Act,Σ,Allow,Tab, (`A)A∈P , (payoffA)A∈P 〉
where
V is a finite set of vertices,
vinit ∈ V is the initial vertex,
P is a finite set of players,
Act is a finite set of actions,
Σ is a finite alphabet,
Allow : V × P → 2Act \ {∅} is a mapping indicating the actions available to a given player
in a given vertex, 2 Tab : V ×ActP → V associates, with a given vertex and a given action
tuple the target vertex,
for every A ∈ P , `A :
(
ActP × V )→ Σ is a signal, and
for every A ∈ P , payoffA : V ·
(
ActP · V )ω → D is a payoff function with values in a domain
D ⊆ R.
We say that the game has public signal if there is ` :
(
ActP × V ) → Σ such that for every
A ∈ P , `A = `.
The signals will help the players monitor the game: for taking decisions, a player will have
the information given by her signal and the action she played earlier. A public signal will
be a common information given to all the players. Our notion of public signal is inspired
by [31] and encompasses the model of [9] where only action names were hidden to the
players. Note that monitoring by public signal does not mean that all the players have the
same information: they have private information implied by their own actions.
An element of ActP is called a move. When an explicit order is given on the set of
players P = {A1, . . . , A|P |}, we will write a move m = (mA)A∈P as 〈mA1 , . . . ,mA|P|〉. If
m ∈ ActP and A ∈ P , we write m(A) for the A-component of m and m(−A) for all but the
A components of m. In particular, we write m(−A) = m′(−A) whenever m(B) = m′(B)
for every B ∈ P \ {A}.
A full history h in G is a finite sequence
v0 ·m0 · v1 ·m1 . . .mk−1 · vk ∈ V ·
(
ActP · V )∗
such that for every 0 ≤ i < k, mi ∈ Allow(vi) and vi+1 = Tab(vi,mi). For readability we
will also write h as
v0
m0−−→ v1 m1−−→ . . . mk−1−−−→ vk
We write last(h) for the last vertex of h, that is, vk. If i ≤ k, we also write h≥i (resp.
h≤i) for the suffix vi ·mi · vi+1 ·mi+1 . . .mk−1 · vk (resp. prefix v0 ·m0 · v1 ·m1 . . .mi−1 · vi).
We write HistG(v0) (or simply Hist(v0) if G is clear in the context) for the set of full histories
2 This condition ensures that the game is non-blocking.
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in G that start at v0. If h ∈ Hist(v0) and h′ ∈ Hist(last(h)), then we write h · h′ for the
obvious concatenation of both histories (it then belongs to Hist(v0)).
Let A ∈ P be a player. The projection of h for A is denoted piA(h) and is defined by
v0 · (m1(A), `A(m1, v1)) · (m2(A), `A(m2, v2)) . . . (mk(A), `A(mk, vk)) ∈ V × (Act× Σ)∗
This will be the information available to player A: it contains both the actions she played
so far and the signal she received. Note that we assume perfect recall, that is, while playing,
A will remember all her past knowledge, that is, all of piA(h) if h has been played so far.
We define the undistinguishability relation ∼A as the equivalence relation over full histories
induced by piA: for two histories h and h′, h ∼A h′ iff piA(h) = piA(h′). While playing, if
h ∼A h′, A will not be able to know whether h or h′ has been played. We also define the
A-label of h as `A(h) = `A(m0, v1) · `A(m1, v2) . . . `A(mk−1, vk).3
We extend all the above notions to infinite sequences in a straightforward way and to
the notion of full play. We write PlaysG(v0) (or simply Plays(v0) if G is clear in the context)
for the set of full plays in G that start at v0.
In the following, we will say that the game G has publicly (resp. privately) visible payoffs if
for every A ∈ P , for every v0 ∈ V , for every ρ, ρ′ ∈ Plays(v0), `A(ρ) = `A(ρ′) (resp. ρ ∼A ρ′)
implies payoffA(ρ) = payoffA(ρ′). Otherwise they are said invisible. Private visibility of
payoffs, while not always assumed (see for instance [19, 3]), are reasonable assumptions:
using only her knowledge, a player knows her payoff. Public visibility is more restrictive,
but will be required for some of the results.
Let A ∈ P be a player. A strategy for player A from v0 is a mapping σA : Hist(v0)→ Act
such that for every history h ∈ Hist(v0), σ(h) ∈ Allow(last(h)). It is said `A-compatible
whenever furthermore, for all histories h, h′ ∈ Hist(v0), h ∼A h′ implies σA(h) = σA(h′).
An outcome of σA is a(n infinite) play ρ = v0 · m0 · v1 · m1 . . . such that for every i ≥ 0,
σA(ρ≤i) = mi(A). We write out(σA, v0) for the set of outcomes of σA from v0.
A strategy profile is a tuple σP = (σA)A∈P , where, for every player A ∈ P , σA is a strategy
for player A. The strategy profile is said info-compatible whenever each σA is `A-compatible.
We write out(σP , v0) for the unique full play from v0, which is an outcome of all strategies
part of σP .
When σP is a strategy profile and σ′A a player-A strategy, we write σP [A/σ′A] for the
profile where A plays according to σ′A, and each other player B plays according to σB . The
strategy σ′A is a deviation of player A, or an A-deviation.
I Definition 2. A Nash equilibrium from v0 is an info-compatible strategy profile σ such
that for every A ∈ P , for every player-A `A-compatible strategy σ′A, payoffA
(
out(σ, v0)
)
≥
payoffA
(
out(σ[A/σ′A], v0)
)
.
In this definition, deviation σ′A needs not be `A-compatible, since the only meaningful part of
σ′A is along out(σ[A/σ′A], v0), where there are no ∼A-equivalent histories: any deviation can
be made `A-compatible without affecting the profitability of the resulting outcome. Note
also that there might be an A-deviation σ′A which is not observable by another player B
3 Note that standardly (see e.g. [36, 5, 22]), the undistinguishability relation for the players is defined
according to `A, not piA as we do here. The difference is that we formally integrate actions of the players
in the memory. While this actually makes no difference for problems like distributed synthesis or even
in our framework here (where strategies are essentially quantified from the start of the game), we
believe this is what should be done when studying complex interactions between players. For instance
this will make a difference for subgame-perfect equilibria. We discuss this in Appendix A.
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yellow green
v0
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5
2,0,0 1,1,0 0,1,0 3,3,3 2,0,0 0,0,0 1,0,0 0,0,1
〈a,a,a〉
〈a,b,a〉 〈b
,a
,a〉
〈b,b,a〉
〈∗,∗,b〉
〈a,
∗,∗
〉 〈b
,∗
,∗〉〈b
,∗,
∗〉
〈a
,∗
,∗〉
〈∗
,a
,a
〉,〈
∗.b
,b
〉 〈∗
,a
,b〉,〈∗
,b,a〉
〈a
,a
,a〉
〈b,a,∗〉
Figure 1 An example of a concurrent game with public signal (yellow and green: public sig-
nal). Edges in red and bold are part of the strategy profile. Dashed edges are the possible devi-
ations. One can notice that none of the deviations is profitable to the deviator, hence the strategy
profile is a Nash equilibrium. Convention in the drawing: edges with no label are for comple-
mentary labels (for instance the edge from v5 to 0, 0, 0 is labelled by all 〈a1, a2, a3〉 not in the set
{〈a, a, a〉, 〈b, a, a〉, 〈b, a, b〉})
(out(σ, v0) ∼B out(σ[A/σ′A], v0)), and there might be two deviations σ′B (by player B)
and σ′C (by player C) that cannot be distinguished by player A (out(σ[B/σ′B ], v0) ∼A
out(σ[C/σ′C ], v0)). Tracking such deviations will be the core of the abstraction we will
develop.
Payoff functions. In the following we will consider various payoff functions. Let Φ be an
ω-regular property over some alphabet Γ. The function payΦ : Γω → {0, 1} is defined by, for
every a ∈ Γω, payΦ(a) = 1 if and only if a |= Φ. A publicly (resp. privately) visible payoff
function payoffA for player A is said associated with Φ over Σ (resp. Act×Σ) whenever it is
defined by payoffA(ρ) = payΦ(`A(ρ)) (resp. payoffA(ρ) = payΦ(piA(ρ)−v0), where piA(ρ)−v0
crops the first v0). Such a payoff function is called a Boolean ω-regular payoff function.
Let Γ be a finite alphabet and w : Γ → Z be a weight assigning a value to every letter
of that alphabet. We define two payoff functions over Γω by, for every a = (ai)i≥1 ∈ Γω,
payMPw(a) = lim infn→∞
1
n
∑n
i=1 w(ai) and payMPw(a) = lim supn→∞
1
n
∑n
i=1 w(ai). A
publicly visible payoff function payoffA for player A is said associated with the liminf (resp.
limsup) mean payoff of w whenener it is defined by payoffA(ρ) = payMPw(`A(ρ)) (resp.
payMPw(`A(ρ))). A privately visible payoff function payoffA for player A is said associated
with the liminf (resp. limsup) mean payoff of w whenener it is defined by payoffA(ρ) =
payMP
w
(piA(ρ)−v0) (resp. payMPw(piA(ρ)−v0)).
A payoff function payoff : V × (ActP × V )ω → D is said prefix-independent whenever for
every full play ρ, for every suffix ρ≥i of ρ, payoff(ρ) = payoff(ρ≥i).
I Example 3. We now illustrate most notions on the game of Fig. 1. This is a game
with three players A1, A2 and A3, and which is played basically in two steps, starting at
v0. Graphically an edge labelled 〈a1, a2, a3〉 between two vertices v and v′ represents the
fact that ai ∈ Allow(v,Ai) for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and that v′ = Tab(v, 〈a1, a2, a3〉). As a
convention, ∗ stands for both a and b. For readability, bottom vertices explicitely indicate
the payoffs of the three players (same order as for actions) if the game ends in that vertex.
After the first step of the game, signal yellow or green is sent to all the players. Histories
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v0 · 〈a, b, a〉 · v2 and v0 · 〈a, a, a〉 · v1 are undistinguishable by A1 and A3 (same action, same
signal), but they can be distinguished by A2 because of different actions (even if the same
signal is observed).
In bold red, we have depicted a strategy profile, which is actually a Nash equilibrium.
We analyze the possible deviations in this game to argue for this.
First there is an A2-deviation to v1. This deviation is invisible to both players A1 and
A3. For this reason, the strategy out of v1 for A1 is to play a (same as out of v2). On
the other hand, even though this would be profitable to her, A1 cannot deviate from
v1, since we are in a branch where A2 has already deviated, and at most one player is
allowed to deviate at a time (and anyway A1 does not know that they are in state v1).
There is an A1-deviation from v2 to 0, 1, 0, which is not profitable to A1.
On the other hand, there is no possible deviation to v3, since this would require two
players to change their actions simultaneously (A1 and A2).
Then, there is an A1-deviation to v4 and another A3-deviation to v5; both activate the
green signal. A2 knows there has been a deviation (because of the green signal), but
she doesn’t know who has deviated and whether the game proceeds to v4 or v5 (but
she knows that if A1 has deviated, then we are in v4, and if A3 has deviated, we are in
v5). Then, A2 has to find a way to punish both players, to be safe. On the other hand,
both players A1 and A3 precisely know what has happened: in case she didn’t deviate
herself, she knows the other one deviated! And she knows in which state the game is in.
Hence in state v4, A3 can help player A2 punishing A1, whereas in state v5, A1 can help
player A2 punishing A3. Examples of punishing moves are therefore those depicted in
red and bold; and they are part of the global strategy profile. Note that the action of
A2 out of v5 has to be the same as the one out of v4: this is required given the imperfect
knowledge of A2. On the other hand, the action of A3 can be different out of v4 and out
of v5 (which is the case in the given example profile).
I Remark. To be fully formal, we use rather heavy notations for concurrent games. We
will use them for the main technical construction of the paper (the epistemic game ab-
straction), but we will allow ourselves simpler notations in other proofs (undecidability and
complexity reductions). For instance, instead of fully defining components Allow and Tab
for a concurrent game, we will better write transitions q 〈a1,a2,a3〉−−−−−−→ q′ to denote the fact that
ai ∈ Allow(q, Ai) (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) and q′ = Tab(q, 〈a1, a2, a3〉).
2.2 Two-player turn-based game structures
They are specific cases of the previous model, where at each vertex, at most one player
has more than one action in her set of allowed actions. But for convenience, we will give a
simplified definition, with only objects that will be useful. A two-player turn-based game
structure is a tuple G = 〈S, SEve, SAdam, sinit, A,Allow,Tab〉, where S = SEve unionsq SAdam is a finite
set of states (states in SEve belong to player Eve whereas states in SAdam belong to player
Adam), sinit ∈ S is the initial state, A is a finite alphabet, Allow : S → 2A \ {∅} gives the
set of available actions, and Tab : S × A → S is the next-state function. If s ∈ SEve (resp.
SAdam), Allow(s) is the set of actions allowed to Eve (resp. Adam) in state s.
In this context, strategies will see sequences of states and actions, with full information.
Note that we do not include any winning condition or payoff function in the tuple, hence
the name structure.
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2.3 The problems we are looking at
We are interested in the constrained existence of a Nash equilibrium. For simplicity, we define
constraints using non-strict thresholds constraints, but could well impose more involved
constraints, like Boolean combinations of linear constraints.
I Problem 1 (Constrained existence problem). Given a game with signals G = 〈V, vinit, P ,Act,Σ,
Allow,Tab, (`A)A∈P , (payoffA)A∈P 〉 and threshold vectors (νA)A∈P , (ν′A)A∈P ∈ Q
P , can we
decide whether there exists a Nash equilibrium σP from vinit such that for every A ∈ P ,
νA ≤ payoffA(out(σP , vinit)) ≤ ν′A? If so, compute one. If the constraints on the payoff are
trivial (that is, νA = −∞ and ν′A = +∞ for every A ∈ P ), we simply speak of the existence
problem.
2.4 First undecidability results
Undecidability of the problem for general signals and publicly visible Boolean ω-regular
objectives. Using the model of concurrent games with signals we can express the grand-
coalition problem in games with imperfect information of [4, 5] (which is strongly related
to the distributed synthesis problem [26]). We can therefore easily infer undecidability of
the constrained existence and then of the existence problem, even for simple Boolean payoff
functions and few players.
I Theorem 4. The existence problem in games with signals is undecidable with three players
and publicly visible Boolean ω-regular payoff functions.
Proof. A game of imperfect information as defined in [4] can be seen as a concurrent game,
with an extra player to resolve the non-determinism allowed in the former model, and signals
that only depend on the current visited vertex. Following this modelization, the grand-
coalition problem then asks whether there are info-compatible strategies for the original
players (they form the so-called “grand-coalition”), such that for every strategy of the extra
player, the outcome of the resulting strategy profile satisfies the given winning condition
(for instance an ω-regular winning condition). It is known that the grand-coalition question
is undecidable, already for reachability properties and two players [4]. Such a reachability
can be obviously made publicly visible to the players (by revealing it when it is reached).
We will explain how this can be coded into a constrained existence problem over the
same game, with three players and Boolean ω-regular payoff functions. We assign to each
of the original players a Boolean payoff function corresponding to their original ω-regular
winning condition Φ, and to the extra player a Boolean payoff function corresponding to the
negation of Φ. The grand-coalition has a winning strategy in the initial game if and only
if there is a Nash equilibrium in the new game, where the original players have a payoffs
1 (which implies that the extra player has payoff 0, but cannot improve). This shows the
undecidability of the constrained existence problem.
Using a trick already used in [9], we can extend this undecidability proof to the existence
problem as follows. Let G be the game discussed above with objective Φ, and build G′ as on
the next picture. Original players appear first in the action tuples, say they are ordered as
P = {A1, . . . , AN}, and the extra player is at the end, called Aextra.
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v′init
v′
payoff 〈1, . . . , 1, 0〉
vinit Copy of G
〈−,...,−,a,a〉,〈−,...,−,b,b〉
〈−,...,−,a,b〉,〈−,...,−,b,a〉
The new initial vertex is v′init, and from there, A1 and Aextra play a matching-penny game
(symbol “−” indicates that the other players have a single action, with no impact). The
new payoff functions are as follows:
Players Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ N) get 1 whenever the game ends in v′, or gets what payoffAi was
giving Ai if the game proceeds to G;
Player Aextra gets 0 whenever the game ends in v′, or gets what payoffAextra was giving
her if the game proceeds to G.
We will check that there is a Nash equilibrium in G′ if and only if there is a Nash
equilibrium where all players except Aextra gets 1 in G. Indeed, assume that σP is a Nash
equilibrium in G where all players except Aextra gets 1. Then playing 〈−, . . . ,−, a, b〉 followed
by σP is a Nash equilibrium in G′.
Conversely assume there is a Nash equilibrium σP in G′. Assume that the outcome of
σP goes to G. Since AN has no profitable deviation, this means that AN has payoff 1 along
that outcome (otherwise AN would deviate to v′). Then the strategy profile after vinit is a
suitable Nash equilibrium in G. Assume now that the outcome of σP goes to v′. Since Aextra
has no profitable deviation, this means in particular that the strategy profile which plays
according to σP after vinit is a suitable Nash equilibrium in G. J
Undecidability of the problem for public signals and private visible mean payoff functions.
We show here that public payoff functions (hence somehow public signals) are necessary to
have our main result (Theorem 19). We argue this in the framework of mean payoff functions.
I Theorem 5. The constrained existence problem in games with a public signal is undecidable
with two players and privately visible mean payoff functions.
Proof. To prove this, we use the undecidability of blind mean-payoff games [19]. In a two-
player turn-based game where the first player is blind (that is, it can only observe that
actions happen, but not get any information on the states the game is visiting), we cannot
decide whether the first player can achieve a positive limsup (or liminf) mean payoff. Note:
in this game, the first player cannot see the encountered weights. Somehow, the payoff
function is invisible.
Let G be a mean-payoff game, in which Eve is assumed to be blind. We assume that the
payoff function of Eve is a limsup payoff function given by weight w (that is, MPw). We
assume “−” is a fresh symbol not used in game G. The alphabet of actions of G′ is the one
fo G, plus that fresh symbol. Further assume that W is the maximal absolute weight value
appearing in the game. We construct the new concurrent game G′ as follows:
it has two players, A1 and A2
if v belongs to Eve in G, then v a−→ v′ is transformed into an edge v 〈a,a〉−−−→ v′ in G′, and
edges v 〈a,b〉−−−→ lost if a 6= b. We define `(〈a, a〉, v′) = − and `(〈a, b〉, lost) = lost
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if v belongs to Adam in G, then v a−→ v′ is transformed into an edge v 〈−,a〉−−−→ v′ in G′; we
set `(v 〈−,a〉−−−→ v′) = −
we have an additional edge lost 〈−,−〉−−−−→ lost, and `(〈−,−〉, lost) = lost
we write transform(e) for the set of transformed edges from e as described above
wA1 assigns 0 to every edge
for every edge e in G, for every e′ ∈ transform(e), wA2(transform(e)) = −w(e)
for e′ = lost 〈−,−〉−−−−→ lost, we set wA2(e′) = −W − 1
We assume that the payoff for player A2 is given by MPwA2 (liminf). The choice for A1
does not matter (the payoff of all plays is 0)... Note that the signal is public and that the
payoff functions are privately visible for the respective players. Also note that A1 has no
incentive to deviate (since the weight is 0 everywhere), and that player A2 has no better
strategy than to copy A1 from (former) Eve-states (otherwise the game proceeds to state
lost and A2 gets the worst he can get). The only way to improve his payoff is therefore to
deviate in some previous Adam-state.
We show that Eve has a winning strategy in the original blind gameG to achieve MPw > 0
if and only if there is a Nash equilibrium in the new game G′ where MPwA2 < 0. Let
σP = (σA1 , σA2) be a Nash equilibrium in G′ achieving MPwA2 < 0. Let ρ = out(σP , v0)
be the main outcome of σP (v0 is the initial vertex). Then MPw(ρ) = −MPwA2 (ρ) > 0.
Furthermore, for every σ′A2 , if ρ
′ = out(σP [A2/σ′A2 ], v0), then MPwA2 (ρ
′) ≤ MPwA2 (ρ) < 0
and MPw(ρ′) > 0. In particular, if Eve follows the strategy of A1 in the original G, she will
ensure MPw > 0.
Conversely pick a winning strategy σEve for Eve ensuring MPw > 0. Since Eve is blind,
σEve can be seen as a single word. Against that (fixed) strategy, Adam has an optimal
counter-strategy σAdam in G (the possible choices of Adam, given the strategy of Eve, can
be represented as an infinite tree, and at any stage he can choose the best subtree; hence
Adam has an optimal strategy!). At each length of the joint outcome prefix, a single choice
has to be made, hence this Adam-strategy can be made blind (we define it as a single word,
representing the choives along the joint outcome); we extend the strategy to other histories
by enforcing `-compatibility. Assume A1 plays according to σEve and A2 according to σAdam.
Let ρ be the outcome of these two strategies. Then A2 has no profitable deviation (since Adam
was playing optimally against σEve) and since MPw(ρ) > 0, it is the case that MPwA2 (ρ) < 0.
So, this is a Nash equilibrium satisfying the required constraint. J
Discussion. While the first undecidability result is not very surprising, since allowing ar-
bitrary private signals can really complexify the structure of players’ knowledge, we believe
that the second result justifies a restriction to public payoff functions to get decidability res-
ults. We also believe that the second result is an argument for restricting to public signal.
Indeed, a hierarchical signal, as standardly done in distributed synthesis, will only make
sense with privately visible payoff functions, hence this will be undecidable.
In the following we will focus on public signals and develop an epistemic game abstraction,
which will record and track possible deviations in the game. This will then be applied to
two frameworks with publicly visible payoff functions.
3 The epistemic game abstraction
Building over [9] and [5], we construct an epistemic game, which will record possible beha-
viours of the system, together with possible unilateral deviations. In [5], notions of epistemic
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Kripke structures are used to really track the precise knowledge of the players. These are
mostly useful since undistinguishable states (expressed using signals here) are assumed ar-
bitrary (no hierarchical structure). We could do the same here, but we think that would be
overly complex and hide the real structure of knowledge in the framework of public signals.
We therefore prefer to stick to simpler subset constructions, which are more commonly used
(see e.g. [27] or later [14, 19, 22]), though it has to be a bit more involved here since also
deviations have to be tracked.
Let G = 〈V, vinit, P ,Act,Σ,Allow,Tab, `, (payoffA)A∈P 〉 be a concurrent game with public
signal. We will first define the epistemic abstraction as a two-player game structure EG =
〈SEve, SAdam, sinit,Σ′,Allow′,Tab′〉, and then state the correspondence between G and EG . The
epistemic abstraction will later be used for decidability and algorithmics purposes.
For clarity, we use the terminology “vertices” in G and “states” (or “epistemic states”)
in EG .
3.1 Construction of the Game Structure EG
The game EG will be played between two players, Eve and Adam. The aim of Eve is to
build a suitable Nash equilibrium, whereas the aim of Adam is to prove that it is not an
equilibrium; in particular, Adam will try to find a profitable deviation (to disprove the claim
of Eve that she is building a Nash equilibrium). Choices available to Eve and Adam in the
abstract game have to reflect partial knowledge of the players in the original game G. States
in the abstract game will therefore store information, which will be sufficient to infer the
undistinguishability relation of all the players in the original game. Thanks to the public
signal assumption, this information will be simple enough to have a simple structure.
In the following, we set P⊥ = P ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is a fresh symbol. For convenience, if
m ∈ ActP , we extend the notation m(−A) when A ∈ P to P⊥ by setting m(−⊥) = m. We
now describe all the components of EG .
A state of Eve will store a set of vertices of the original game one can be in, together
with possible deviators. More precisely, states of Eve are defined as SEve = {s : P⊥ → 2V |
|s(⊥)| ≤ 1}. Let s ∈ SEve. If A ∈ P , vertices of s(A) are those where the game can be
in, assuming one has followed the suggestions of Eve so far, up to an A-deviation; on the
other hand, if s(⊥) 6= ∅, the single vertex v ∈ s(⊥) is the one the game is in, assuming
one has followed all suggestions by Eve so far (in particular, if Eve is building a Nash
equilibrium, then this vertex belongs to the main outcome of the equilibrium). We define
sit(s) = {(v,A) ∈ V × P⊥ | v ∈ s(A)} for the set of situations the game can be in at s:
(a) (v,⊥) ∈ sit(s) is the situation where the game has proceeded to vertex v without any
deviation;
(b) (v,A) ∈ sit(s) with A ∈ P is the situation where the game has proceeded to vertex v
benefitting, from an A-deviation.
Structure of state s will allow to infer the undistinguishability relation of all the players in
game G: basically (and we will formalize this later), if she is not responsible for a deviation,
player A ∈ P will not know in which of the situations of sit(s) \ V × {A} the game has
proceeded; if she is responsible for a deviation, player A will know exactly in which vertex
v ∈ s(A) the game has proceeded.
Let s ∈ SEve. From state s, Eve will suggest a tuple of moves M , one for each possible
situation (v,A) ∈ sit(s). This tuple of moves has to satisfy the undistinguishability relation:
if a player does not distinguish between two situations, her action should be the same in
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these two situations:
Allow′(s) =
{
M ∈
∏
(v,A)∈sit(s)
Allow(v) | ∀(vB , B), (vC , C) ∈ sit(s),
∀A ∈ P \ {B,C}, M(vB , B)(A) = M(vC , C)(A)
}
In the above set, the constraint M(vB , B)(A) = M(vC , C)(A) expresses the fact that player
A should play the same action in the two situations (vB , B) and (vC , C), since she does not
distinguish between them. Obviously, we assume Σ′ contains all elements of Allow′(s) above.
States of Adam are then copies of states of Eve with suggestions given by Eve, that is:
SAdam = {(s,M) | s ∈ SEve × Allow′(s)}. And naturally, we define Tab′(s,M) = (s,M) if
M ∈ Allow′(s).
Let (s,M) ∈ SAdam. From state (s,M), Adam will choose a signal value which can be
activated from some situation allowed in s, after no deviation or a single-player deviation
w.r.t. M . From a situation (v,A) ∈ sit(s) with A ∈ P , only A-deviations can be allowed
(since we look for unilateral deviations), hence any signal activated by an A-deviation (w.r.t.
M(v,A)) from v should be allowed. From the situation (v,⊥) ∈ sit(s) (if there is one), one
can continue without any deviation, or any kind of single-player deviation should be allowed,
hence the signal activated by M(v,⊥) from v should be allowed, and any signal activated
by some A-deviation (w.r.t. M(v,⊥)) from v should be allowed as well. Formally:
Allow′(s,M) =
β ∈ Σ |||||
∃A ∈ P
∃v ∈ s(A)
∃m ∈ ActP
s.t. (i) m(−A) = M(v,A)(−A)(ii) `(m,Tab(v,m)) = β

∪
β ∈ Σ |||||
∃v ∈ s(⊥)
∃m ∈ ActP
∃A ∈ P
s.t. (i) m(−A) = M(v,⊥)(−A)(ii) `(m,Tab(v,m)) = β

Note that we implicitly assume that Σ′ contains Σ.
It remains to explain how one can compute the next state of some (s,M) ∈ SAdam after
some signal value β ∈ Allow′(s,M). The new state has to represent the new knowledge of
the players in the original game when they have seen signal β; this has to take into account
all possible deviations that we have already discussed which activate the signal value β. The
new state is the result of several simultaneous subset constructions, which we formalize as
follows: s′ = Tab′((s,M), β), where for every A ∈ P⊥, v′ ∈ s′(A) if and only if there is
m ∈ ActP such that β = `(m, v′), and
1. either there is v ∈ s(A) such that m(−A) = M(v,A)(−A) and v′ = Tab(v,m);
2. or there is v ∈ s(⊥) such that m(−A) = M(v,⊥)(−A) and v′ = Tab(v,m).
Note that in case A = ⊥, the two above cases are redundant.
Before stating properties of EG , we illustrate the construction.
I Example 6. We consider again the example of Fig. 1, and we assume that the public signal
when reaching the leaves of the game is uniformly orange. We depict (part of) the epistemic
game abstraction of the game on Fig. 2. One can notice that from Eve-states s1 and s2,
moves are multi-dimensional, in the sense that there is one move per vertex appearing in the
state. There are nevertheless compatibility conditions which should be satisfied (expressed
in condition Allow′); for instance, from s2, player A2 does not distinguish between the two
options (i) A1 has deviated and the game is in v4, and (ii) A3 has deviated and the game is
in v5, hence the action of player A2 should be the same in the two moves (a in the depicted
example, written in red).
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⊥7→{v0}
A1 7→∅
A2 7→∅
A3 7→∅
s0
Eve-state
s0,〈a,b,a〉
Adam-state ⊥7→{v2}
A1 7→∅
A2 7→{v1}
A3 7→∅
s1
⊥7→∅
A1 7→{v4}
A2 7→∅
A3 7→{v5}
s2
...
s1,
〈a,−,−〉
〈a,−,−〉
⊥7→{(1,1,0)}
A1 7→{(0,1,0)}
A2 7→{(1,1,0)}
A3 7→∅
s1,
〈b,a,b〉
〈a,a,a〉
⊥7→∅
A1 7→{(0,0,0)}
A2 7→∅
A3 7→{(1,0,0),(0,0,0)}
s1,
〈b,−,−〉
〈b,−,−〉
⊥7→{(0,1,0)}
A1 7→{(1,1,0)}
A2 7→{(2,0,0)}
A3 7→∅
〈a,b,a〉 •
•
〈a,−,−〉
〈a,−,−〉 •
〈b,a,b〉
〈a,a,a〉 •
〈b,
−,
−〉
〈b,
−,
−〉
•
Figure 2 Part of the epistemic game corresponding to the game of Fig. 1. For clarity, symbol −
is for any choice a or b (the precise choice is meaningless).
3.2 Interpretation of this abstraction
We gave an intuitive meaning to the (epistemic) states of EG , we now need to formalize it.
To that aim, we need to explain how full histories and plays in EG can be interpreted as full
histories and plays in G.
Let v0 ∈ V , and define s0 : P⊥ → 2V ∈ SEve such that s0(⊥) = {v0} and s0(A) = ∅
for every A ∈ P . In the following, when M ∈ Allow′(s) for some s ∈ SEve, if we speak of
some M(v,A), we implicitly assume that (v,A) ∈ sit(s). Given a full history H = s0 M0−−→
(s0,M0)
β0−→ s1 M1−−→ (s1,M1) β1−→ s2 . . . (sk−1,Mk−1) βk−1−−−→ sk in EG , we write concrete(H)
for the set of full histories in the original game, which correspond to H, up to a single
deviation, that is: v0
m0−−→ v1 m1−−→ v2 . . . vk−1 mk−1−−−→ vk ∈ concrete(H) whenever for every
0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, vi+1 = Tab(vi,mi) and βi = `(mi, vi+1), and:
(a) either mi = Mi(vi,⊥) for every 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1;
(b) or there exist A ∈ P and 0 ≤ i0 ≤ k − 1 such that
(i) for every 0 ≤ i < i0, mi = Mi(vi,⊥);
(ii) mi0 6= Mi0(vi0 ,⊥), but mi0(−A) = Mi0(vi0 ,⊥)(−A);
(iii) for every i0 < i ≤ k − 1, mi(−A) = Mi(vi, A)(−A).
Case (a) corresponds to a concrete history with no deviation (all moves suggested by Eve
have been followed). Case (b) corresponds to a deviation by player A, and i0 is the position
at which player A has started deviating.
We write concrete⊥(H) for the set of histories of type (a); there is at most one such
history, which is the real concrete history suggested by Eve. And we write concreteA(H)
for the set of histories of the type (b) with deviator A. We extend all these notions to full
plays. A full play visiting only Eve-states s such that s(⊥) 6= ∅ is called a ⊥-play.
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We will now state several properties, which will explicit the information stored in the
(states of the) epistemic game abstraction, and make clear how one can infer the undistin-
guishability relations of the various players thanks to that information.
The two following lemmas can be easily infered from the definitions:
I Lemma 7. The set concrete⊥(H) contains at most one element, and it has exactly one
element if and only if sk(⊥) 6= ∅. If concrete⊥(H) = {v0 m0−−→ v1 m1−−→ v2 . . . vk−1 mk−1−−−→ vk},
it is the case that si(⊥) = {vi} for every 0 ≤ i ≤ k.
I Lemma 8. Let A ∈ P . Then:
Assume v0
m0−−→ v1 m1−−→ v2 . . . vk−1 mk−1−−−→ vk ∈ concreteA(H) with index i0. Then for
every 0 ≤ i ≤ i0, si(⊥) = {vi}, and for every i0 < i ≤ k − 1, vi ∈ si(A).
For every vk ∈ sk(A), there is some h ∈ concreteA(H) such that last(h) = vk.
The set concrete⊥(H), if non-empty, stores the real history of the game, if no deviation
has occurred. On the other hand, there can be deviations of one of the players; they will
appear in concreteA(H) (meaning that A has deviated). As long as states of H have a non-
empty ⊥-component, those deviations will somehow be invisible to other players, whereas
when we will reach a state with no ⊥-component, those deviations will partly be visible to
other players.
We now explain how the structure of EG explicit the undistinguishability relations of the
players.
I Lemma 9. Let A ∈ P , and pick h1 6= h2 ∈ concrete(H). Then h1 ∼A h2 if and only if
h1, h2 /∈ concreteA(H).
Proof. By setting i0 = k+ 1, one can treat the unique history in concrete⊥(H) similarly to
other histories in concreteB(H) for B ∈ P .
For j ∈ {1, 2}, we let Bj ∈ P⊥ \ {A} such that hj ∈ concreteBj (H) with index ij0. We
write hj = v0
mj0−−→ vj1
mj1−−→ vj2 . . .
mj
k−1−−−→ vjk. By construction, we have (i) for every i < ij0,
mji = Mi(v
j
i ,⊥), (ii) mjij0(−Bj) = Mij0(v
j
ij0
,⊥)(−Bj), (iii) for every i > ij0, mji (−Bj) =
Mi(vji , Bj)(−Bj). Also, for every i, `(mji , vji+1) = βi.
Player A only sees hj through its piA-projection, that is:
piA(hj) = v0 · (mj0(A), `(mj0, vj1)) · (mj1(A), `(mj1, vj2)) . . . (mjk−1(A), `(mjk−1, vjk))
= v0 · (mj0(A), β0) · (mj1(A), β1) . . . (mjk−1(A), βk−1)
Note that, writing i0 for min(i10, i20), we have:
(a) for every 0 ≤ i < i0, m1i = m2i , hence (h1)≤i0 = (h2)≤i0 ;
(b) h1 ∼A h2 if and only if for every 0 ≤ i < k, m1i (A) = m2i (A).
W.l.o.g. we assume i10 ≤ i20.
First assume that B1 = A (i.e. h1 ∈ concreteA(H)). It is the case that m1i10(A) 6=
Mi10(v
1
i10
,⊥)(A). Towards a contradiction, we assume h1 ∼A h2. It implies m2i20(A) =
m1
i10
(A) 6= Mi10(v1i10 ,⊥)(A). Hence, B2 = A as well, and i
1
0 = i0. We deduce that
(h1)≤i0+1 = (h2)≤i0+1. By induction, it is now easy to infer from (iii) above and from
the fact that m1i (A) = m2i (A) for every i (since h1 ∼A h2), that h1 = h2, which yields a
contradiction. Thus, it cannot be the case, under hypothesis B1 = A, that h1 ∼A h2.
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Next assume that B1 6= A, i10 < i20 and B2 = A (i.e. h2 ∈ concreteA(H)). By definition
of Allow′ (since A 6= B1), it is the case that Mi20(v1i20 , B1)(A) = Mi20(v
2
i20
,⊥)(A). Now
it is the case that m1
i20
(A) = Mi20(v
1
i20
, B1)(A) while m2i20(A) 6= Mi20(v
2
i20
,⊥)(A). Hence,
h1 ∼A h2.
Then assume thatB1 6= A andB2 6= A. By definition of Allow′, we have thatMi(v1i , B1)(A) =
Mi(v2i , B2)(A) for every i. In particular, since m1i (A) = Mi(v1i , B1)(A) and m2i (A) =
Mi(v2i , B2)(A) for every i, we deduce that h1 ∼A h2.
We have therefore shown the expected equivalence. J
Assuming public visibility of the original payoff functions in G, we can define when R is
a full play in EG , and A ∈ P , payoff′A(R) = payoffA(ρ), where ρ ∈ concrete(R).
I Lemma 10. Assuming public visibility of the original payoff functions in G, the payoff
function payoff′A is well-defined.
Proof. Write R = s0
M0−−→ (s0,M0) β0−→ s1 . . . sk Mk−−→ (sk,Mk) βk−→ sk+1 . . .. It is sufficient
to notice that ρ, ρ′ ∈ concrete(R) imply `(ρ) = `(ρ′). Hence for every A ∈ P , payoffA(ρ) =
payoffA(ρ′). Therefore, payoff′A(R) does not depend on the choice of the witness ρ. J
3.3 Winning condition of Eve
A zero-sum game will be played on the game structure EG , and the winning condition of Eve
will be given on the branching structure of the set of outcomes of a strategy for Eve, and
not individually on each outcome, as standardly in two-player zero-sum games. We write
sinit for the state of Eve such that sinit(⊥) = {vinit} and sinit(A) = ∅ for every A ∈ P . Let
p = (pA)A∈P ∈ RP , and σEve be a strategy for Eve in EG ; it is said winning for p from sinit
whenever payoff(ρ) = p, where ρ is the unique element of concrete⊥(out⊥(σEve, sinit)) (where
we write out⊥(σEve, sinit) for the unique outcome of σEve from sinit which is a ⊥-play), and
for every R ∈ out(σEve, sinit), for every A ∈ P , for every ρ ∈ concreteA(R), payoffA(ρ) ≤ pA.
For every epistemic state s ∈ SEve, we define the set of suspect players susp(s) = {A ∈ P |
s(A) 6= ∅} (this is the set of players that may have deviated). By extension, if R = s0 M0−−→
(s0,M0)
β0−→ s1 . . . sk Mk−−→ (sk,Mk) βk−→ sk+1 . . ., we define susp(R) = limk→∞ susp(sk). Note
that the sequence (susp(sk))k is non-increasing, hence it stabilizes.
Assuming public visibility of the payoff functions in G, we can define when R is a full play
in EG , and A ∈ P , payoff′A(R) = payoffA(ρ), where ρ ∈ concrete(R). It is easy to show that
payoff′A is well-defined for every A ∈ P . Under this assumption, the winning condition of Eve
can be rewritten as: σEve is winning for p from sinit whenever payoff′(out⊥(σEve, sinit)) = p,
and for every R ∈ out(σEve, sinit), for every A ∈ susp(R), payoff′A(R) ≤ pA.
3.4 Correction of the epistemic abstraction
The epistemic abstraction tracks everything that is required to detect Nash equilibria in the
original game, which we make explicit in the next result. Note that this theorem does not
require public visibility of the payoff functions.
I Theorem 11. Let G be a concurrent game with public signal, and p ∈ RP . There is a
Nash equilibrium in G with payoff p from vinit if and only if Eve has a winning strategy for
p in EG from sinit.
The proof of this theorem highlights a correspondence between Nash equilibria in G and
winning strategies of Eve in EG . In this correspondence, the main outcome of the equilibrium
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in G is the unique ⊥-concretisation of the unique ⊥-play generated by the winning strategy
of Eve.
Proof. We fix an initial vertex v0 in G, and we let s0 be its corresponding initial state in EG
(that is, s0(⊥) = {v0} and for every A ∈ P , s0(A) = ∅.
Assume first that σP = (σA)A∈P is a Nash equilibrium in the original game G from v0
with payoff p. We define a strategy σEve for Eve in the epistemic game EG , which we will
show is winning from s0 for p.
Let H = s0
M0−−→ (s0,M0) β0−→ s1 M1−−→ (s1,M1) β1−→ s2 . . . Mk−1−−−−→ (sk−1,Mk−1) βk−1−−−→ sk
be a full history in EG . Fix A ∈ P . For every B ∈ P⊥ \ {A}, for every h ∈ concreteB(H) \
concreteA(H), we set σEve(H)(last(h), B)(A) = σA(h). If some coordinate is not definable
that way, we set it arbitrarily.
We need to show that this is well-defined. Pick h, h′ ∈ concrete(H) \ concreteA(H).
By Lemma 9, h ∼A h′. Hence we deduce that σA(h) = σA(h), which implies that σEve is
well-defined and that σEve(H) ∈ Allow′(last(H)).
We now show that σEve is a winning strategy from s0 for p. First notice that out(σP , v0)
coincides with the unique element ρ⊥ of concrete⊥(out⊥(σEve, s0)), hence payoff(ρ⊥) = p.
Let R = s0
M0−−→ (s0,M0) β0−→ s1 M1−−→ (s1,M1) β1−→ s2 . . . be an (infinite) outcome of σEve.
Pick ρ ∈ concrete(R) such that ρ 6= ρ⊥. There is A ∈ P such that ρ ∈ concreteA(R), with
index k. In particular we can write ρ = v0
m0−−→ v1 . . . mk−1−−−→ vk . . . such that (i) for every
i < k, mi = Mi(vi,⊥), (ii) mk(−A) = Mk(vk,⊥)(−A) and mk(A) 6= Mk(vk,⊥)(A), (iii) for
every i > k, mi(−A) = Mi(vi, A)(−A); and `(mi, vi+1) = βi for every i. From ρ we design
a deviation σ′A for player A in G as follows:
for every prefix ρ≤i of ρ, σ′A(ρ≤i) = mi(A);
we extend σ′A to histories that are undistinguishable by A from some ρ≤i;
we set σ′A(h) = σA(h) for all other histories h.
By construction, this is a well-defined info-compatible strategy for player A in G. We
use it as a deviation w.r.t. σP . Since σP is a Nash equilibrium, it is the case that
payoffA(out(σP [A/σ′A], v0)) ≤ payoffA(out(σP , v0)) = pA. By construction we have ρ =
out(σP [A/σ′A], v0), and therefore payoffA(ρ) ≤ pA. We conclude that σEve is a winning
strategy.
Conversely consider a winning strategy σEve from s0 in the epistemic game EG . When
we build the strategy profile σP , we need not only to check the main outcome, but also to
somehow foresee the possible deviations. We build σP inductively on the length of histories.
We maintain the following invariant: For all histories of length at most i, which can be
obtained as generated by σP or by a deviation by a unique player, we know a (partial)
function fi : HistG → HistEG such that:
(i) fi extends fi−1 (if i > 0), and dom(fi) only contains histories of length at most i;
(ii) if h is a prefix of out(σP , v0) or a prefix of a single-player deviation out(σP [A/σ′A], v0)
of length at most i, then h ∈ dom(fi);
(iii) for every h ∈ dom(fi), h ∈ concrete(fi(h)) and fi(h) is a prefix of an outcome of σEve;
(iv) if h is a prefix of out(σP , v0), then fi(h) is a prefix of out⊥(σEve, s0) and h is the unique
element of concrete⊥(fi(h));
(v) if h is a prefix of out(σP [A/σ′A], v0) for some player-A deviation σ′A, then fi(h) is a
prefix of some outcome in out(σEve, s0) and h ∈ concreteA(fi(h));
(vi) for every A ∈ P , for every h ∼A h′, if h ∈ dom(fi), then h′ ∈ dom(fi) and fi(h) =
fi(h′).
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The base case i = 0 is obvious, since there is a single history of length 0 both in G
and in EG . We assume we have proven the result for i. We first initialize fi+1 as fi on
dom(fi). Then, we consider a length-i outcome h of either σP (no deviation so far) or of
σP [B/σ′B ] for some (real)4 B-deviation σ′B , from v0. For every A ∈ P , we define σA(h) =
σEve(fi(h))(last(h),⊥)(A) if h is an outcome of σP , and σA(h) = σEve(fi(h))(last(h), B)(A)
is the result of a (real) B-deviation w.r.t σP . If there is only one such h, then this is
well-defined.
Otherwise, pick two such distinct outcomes h and h′ such that h ∼A h′. By (vi),
fi(h) = fi(h′), which we denote H. By Lemma 9, h, h′ ∈ concrete(H) \ concreteA(H). Let
B,B′ ∈ P⊥\{A} such that h ∈ concreteB(H) and h′ ∈ concreteB′(H). Now, since σEve(H) ∈
Allow′(last(H)), it is the case that σEve(H)(last(h), B)(A) = σEve(H)(last(h′), B′)(A). This
implies that σA(h) = σA(h′), hence the profile σP is properly defined (values of σP outside
the above domain is not important and can be set arbitrarily).
Further define fi+1 as follows:
Let h be the length-i outcome of σP from v0. Then the history h′ = h
σP (h)−−−→ v is
the length-(i + 1) outcome of σP (where we have written v for Tab(last(h), σP (h))):
we set fi+1(h′) =
(
fi(h)
σEve(fi(h))−−−−−−−→ (s, σEve(fi(h))) β−→ s′
)
, where s = last(fi(h)), β =
`(σP (h), v) and s′ = Tab((s, σEve(fi(h))), β).
Let h be a length-i outcome of σP or of some real A-deviation σP [A/σ′A] from v0. Then for
everym′ ∈ ActP such thatm′(−A) = σP (h)(−A), h′ = h m
′
−−→ v is a length-(i+1) outcome
of some A-deviation σP [A/σ′A] (where we have written v for Tab(last(h), σP (h))): we set
fi+1(h′) =
(
fi(h)
σEve(fi(h))−−−−−−−→ (s, σEve(fi(h))) β−→ s′
)
, where s = last(fi(h)), β = `(m′, v)
and s′ = Tab((s, σEve(fi(h))), β).
Conditions (i)–(v) are now easy to get, by definition of the various objects. It remains to
show condition (vi). Assume that hj
mj−−→ vj (with j = 1, 2) are two different length-(i+ 1)
outcomes in the domain of fi+1, and assume that
(
h1
m1−−→ v1
)
∼A
(
h2
m2−−→ v2
)
for some
A ∈ P . Then:
h1 ∼A h2, hence fi(h1) (vi)= fi(h2);
m1(A) = m2(A) and `(m1, v1) = `(m2, v2).
By construction,
fi+1(hj) =
(
fi(hj)
σEve(fi(hj))−−−−−−−→ (sj , σEve(fi(hj))) βj−→ s′j
)
where sj = last(fi(hj)), βj = `(mj , vj) and s′j = Tab((sj , σEve(fi(hj))), βj). This value is
the same for both j = 1 and j = 2. Hence point (vi) is now proven. This concludes the
induction step.
We now show that σP is a Nash equilibrium from v0. We first define the function f
as the limit of the sequence (fi)i∈N: f can speak of finite histories and infinite plays. Let
ρ = out(σP , v0). By (iv) characterizing f , we get that f(ρ) = out⊥(σEve, s0) and ρ is
the unique element of concrete⊥(f(ρ)). Since σEve is winning with payoff p, we get that
p = payoff(ρ).
4 In this context, a real deviation is one which does generate an outcome different from the main outcome
without deviation.
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Consider some A-deviation σ′A, and write ρ′ = out(σP [A/σ′A], v0). By (ii) and (v), we
deduce ρ′ ∈ dom(f), f(ρ′) ∈ out(σEve, s0) and ρ′ ∈ concreteA(f(ρ′)). Since σEve is a winning
strategy for Eve, we get that payoffA(ρ′) ≤ pA. That is, there is no profitable deviation for
every A ∈ P : σP is a Nash equilibrium with payoff p. J
3.5 Remarks on the construction
We did not formalize the epistemic unfolding as it is made in [5]. We believe we do not
really learn anything for public signal using it. And the above extended subset construction
can much better be understood.
One could argue that this epistemic game gives more information to the players, since
Eve explicitely gives to everyone the move that should be played. But in the real game,
the players also have that information, which is obtained by an initial coordination of the
players (this is required to achieve equilibria).
Finally, notice that the espitemic game constructed here generalizes the suspect game
construction of [9], where all players have perfect information on the states of the game, but
cannot see the actions that are precisely played. Somehow, games in [9] have a public signal
telling the state the game is in (that is, `(m, v) = v). So, in the suspect game of [9], the
sole uncertainty is in the players that may have deviated, not in the set of states that are
visited.
I Remark. Let us analyze the size of the epistemic game abstraction.
The size of the alphabet is bounded by |Σ|+ |Act||P |·|V |·(1+|P |). Since |Σ| is bounded by
|V | · |Act||P |, the size of the alphabet is in O(|Act||P |2·|V |)
The number of states is therefore in O(2|P |·|V | · |Act||P |2·|V |).
The epistemic game is therefore of exponential size w.r.t. the initial game. Note that we
could reduce the bounds by using tricks like those in [9, Prop. 4.8], but this would not avoid
an exponential blowup.
4 Algorithmics for publicly visible payoffs
While the construction of the epistemic game has transformed the computation of Nash
equilibria in a concurrent game with public signal to the computation of winning strategies
in a two-player zero-sum turn-based game, we cannot apply standard algorithms out-of-the-
box, because the winning condition is rather complex. In the following, we present two
applications of that approach in the context of publicly visible payoffs, one with Boolean
payoff functions, and another with mean payoff functions. Remember that in the latter case,
public visibility is required to have decidability (Theorem 5).
We let G = 〈V, vinit, P ,Act,Σ,Allow,Tab, `, (payoffA)A∈P 〉 be a concurrent game with pub-
lic signal, and we let EG = 〈SEve, SAdam, sinit,ActP ∪ Σ,Allow′,Tab′〉 be its epistemic game
abstraction. We write S⊥ = {s ∈ SEve | s(⊥) 6= ∅}. The ⊥-part of EG is the set of states
S⊥ ∪ {(s,M) ∈ SAdam | s ∈ S⊥}.
In this section, otherwise specified, we assume public visibility and prefix-independence of
payoff functions. We recall this notion here: A payoff function payoff : V × (ActP ×V )ω → D
is said prefix-independent whenever for every full play ρ, for every suffix ρ≥i of ρ, payoff(ρ) =
payoff(ρ≥i).
Thanks to Lemma 10 (see page 15), one can therefore attach to every full play R of EG , a
|P |-dimensional payoff vector payoff′(R) = (payoff′A(R))A∈P . We then recall here the winning
condition for Eve in EG : a strategy σEve is winning whenever there exists some p = (pA)A∈P
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such that payoff′(out⊥(σEve, s0)) = p, and for every R ∈ out(σEve, s0), for every A ∈ susp(R),
payoff′A(R) ≤ pA.
4.1 First reduction
We define the value of epistemic state s as follows:
value(s) = {w ∈ RP | ∃σEve∀ρ ∈ out(σEve, s) ∀A ∈ susp(ρ), payoff′A(ρ) ≤ w(A)}
The set value(s) is upward-closed, and we want to compute a representation thereof. Note
that for all players A ∈ P \ susp(s), one can represent possible values for A by −∞.
Somehow, the set value(s) stores the possible payoffs than one should achieve along
the main outcome of a candidate Nash equilibrium when a deviation to s may happen.
Otherwise, one of the suspect players will manage to deviate and have a larger payoff. This
is formalized as follows.
I Lemma 12. Eve has a winning strategy in EG from s0 for payoff vector p if and only there
is a ⊥-play R = s0 M0−−→ (s0,M0) β0−→ s1 . . . sk−1 Mk−1−−−−→ (sk−1,Mk−1) βk−1−−−→ sk . . . from s0,
such that p = (payoff′A(R))A∈P , and for every history s0
M0−−→ (s0,M0) β0−→ s1 . . . si−1 Mi−1−−−→
(si−1,Mi−1)
β′i−1−−−→ s, p ∈ value(s).
In the above lemma, s0
M0−−→ (s0,M0) β0−→ s1 . . . si−1 Mi−1−−−→ (si−1,Mi−1)
β′i−1−−−→ s corres-
ponds to a prefix of R with a one-step deviation from an Adam-state.
Proof. Assume σEve is a winning strategy for Eve in EG . Let R = out⊥(σEve, s0) be the main
outcome of σEve from s0, and p its payoff. For all R′ ∈ out(σEve, s0), for every A ∈ susp(R),
payoff′A(R) ≤ pA.
Pick some history H = s0
M0−−→ (s0,M0) β0−→ s1 . . . si−1 Mi−1−−−→ (si−1,Mi−1)
β′i−1−−−→ s
generated by σEve, where all but the last move follow R. Consider the strategy σ′Eve, such that
for every history H ′ starting at s, σ′Eve(H ′) = σEve(H ·H ′). Then, for every R′ ∈ out(σ′Eve, s),
H · R′ ∈ out(σEve, s0). Hence, since σEve is winning, for every R′ ∈ out(σ′Eve, s), for every
A ∈ susp(R′), payoff′A(H · R′) ≤ pA. Since payoff′A is prefix-independent, payoff′A(R′) =
payoff′A(H ·R′) ≤ pA, hence p ∈ value(s).
Conversely assume R is a ⊥-play with payoff p, and such that it satisfies the hypotheses
of the lemma, and for every state s resulting from a single-move deviation of R, let σs be a
strategy witnessing the fact that p ∈ value(s). Define σEve as a strategy following R along
the prefixes of R, and which plays according to σs when Adam deviates from R at state s.
Then it is not difficult to see that this is a winning strategy for Eve in EG . J
Together with Theorem 11, the above lemma reduces the problem of computing Nash
equilibria (for prefix-independent payoff functions) in the original game to:
(i) the computation of (representatives of) the sets value(s) when s ∈ SEve \ S⊥
(ii) the search of a ⊥-play satisfying the constraints of the lemma.
4.2 Generic procedure to compute the value sets for
prefix-independent payoffs
The game EG has a specific structure, in which the set of suspects along a play is non-
increasing (and stabilizing...), as soon as we leave the (main) ⊥-part of the game. We will
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use this structure to design a generic bottom-up procedure to compute the values of states
in the non-⊥-part of EG .
We make the following hypothesis. We have an oracle which, given a tuple G =
〈〈S, SEve, SAdam, sinit, A,Allow,Tab〉, Sout, γ, δ〉, where the first component is a turn-based game
structure, Sout ⊆ S is a set of output states such that for every s ∈ Sout, for every
a ∈ Allow(s), Tab(s, a) = s,5 δ : Sout → Up(Rd) assigns an upward-closed set of Rd to
every output state, and γ : PlaysG → R
d is a d-dimensional payoff function), computes at
any state of the game, the set
valG(s) =
{
w ∈ Rd ||| ∃σEve∀R ∈ out(σEve, s)
R not visiting Sout implies γ(R) ≤ w, and
R ending up in s′ ∈ Sout implies w ∈ δ(s′)
}
We will define subgames of EG , where sets of suspects will be fixed. The idea is that,
within such a game, the payoff reduces to a multi-dimensional standard payoff function, with
nodes connected to lower components (where the set of suspects is reduced). Then using a
bottom-up computation, we will compute the value sets in all states of SEve \ S⊥ in EG .
We formalize this idea now. Inductively, we define for every S ⊆ P a core game CoreS =
〈〈SS , SSEve, SSAdam, sSinit,ActP ∪ Σ,Allow′|SSEve∪SSAdam ,Tab
S
|SSEve∪SSAdam〉, S
S
out, γ
S , δS〉 as follows.
SS = SSEve ∪ SSAdam
SSEve = {s ∈ SEve \ S⊥ | susp(s) = S} ∪ {s′ ∈ SEve | S 6= susp(s) ⊆ S and ∃s ∈
SAdam with susp(s) = S and s′ = Tab′(s,m) for some m in EG}
SSAdam = {s ∈ SAdam \ S⊥ | susp(s) = S} ∪ {s′ ∈ SAdam | S 6= susp(s) ⊆ S and ∃s ∈
SEve with susp(s) = S and s′ = Tab′(s,m) for some m in EG}
SSout = {s ∈ SS | susp(s) 6= S}
for every infinite play R in CoreS not visiting SSout, for every A ∈ S, we set γS(R) =
payoff′A(R) (this is a |S|-dimensional payoff function)
for every history ending in s ∈ SSout,
δS(s) = {w ∈ RS | w|susp(s) ∈ valCoresusp(s)(s)}
Correctness of the approach is stated below:
I Lemma 13. Let s ∈ S \ S⊥. Then s is a state of the core game Coresusp(s). And
value(s) = {w ∈ RP | w|susp(s) ∈ valCoresusp(s)(s)}
Proof. The proof is by induction on the set S of suspects.
The base case is a state s of CoreS such that S is minimal. For that S, SSout = ∅. Seing
s as a state of EG , the set value(s) can be seen as the value set of the multiple-dimension
payoff function (payoff′A)A∈S , which is exactly what the oracle computes for us.
We assume that for every set S 6= S ′ ⊆ S, we have shown that for every s′ such that
susp(s′) = S ′, value(s′) = {w ∈ RP | w|S′ ∈ valCoreS′ (s′)}.
Pick a strategy σEve in EG from s that witnesses some w ∈ value(s). Pick an outcome R
of σEve which leaves Coresusp(s) (viewed as a subarena of EG) at state s′ ∈ Ssusp(s)out after prefix
H. Write S ′ = susp(s′). Then σP after prefix H achieves w as well (by prefix-independence):
w ∈ value(s′) By induction hypothesis, w|S′ ∈ valCoreS′ (s′), hence w|S ∈ δS(s′). Hence σEve
5 We could instead say that s is blocking, in that there is no allowed action, but this would not fit our
formal definition of a game. Hence we use this trick here.
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(pruned when leaving CoreS) achieves valCoreS (s) (since all outcomes which do not leave the
current core are no problem for the winning condition). We conclude that
value(s) ⊆ {w ∈ RP | w|susp(s) ∈ valCoresusp(s)(s)}
Conversely, pick a strategy σEve in Coresusp(s) from s which witnesses w|S ∈ valCoresusp(s)(s).
Pick an outcome R of σEve which leaves at s′ ∈ SSout, and let h be the smallest prefix of
R reaching s′. Write S ′ = susp(s′). Then, w|S ∈ δS(s′), that is, w|S′ ∈ valCoreS′ (s′). In
particular, by induction hypothesis, we get that w ∈ value(s′). For every state s′ ∈ SSout
reachable via σEve, we let σs
′ be a strategy in EG which witnesses w from s′. Then, let σ′Eve
be the strategy that plays according to σEve as long as we do not visit SSout, and switches
to σs′ as soon as we visit s′ ∈ SSout. This is not difficult to show that this strategy achieves
w! J
4.3 Boolean ω-regular objectives
For prefix-independent ω-regular objectives, we will use the generic approach presented pre-
viously. We assume that each payoff function payoffA is associated with a prefix-independent
Boolean (ω-regular) objective ΩA over Σ. The payoff value domain D is {0, 1}. Hence, for
readability we can assume that various values are taken in {0, 1} as well (instead of R).
We consider a core game CoreS and a state s such that susp(s) = S. We have that
(1)S ∈ valCoreS (s).6 The set of possible improvements of those values is finite (try to assign
0 instead of 1 to every player A ∈ S).
For each S ′ ⊆ S, we write w[S ′] for the vector (0)A∈S′ ∪ (1)A∈S\S′ . Then: w[S ′] ∈
valCoreS (s) = value(s) if and only if Eve has a strategy to enforce( ⋂
A∈S′
ΩcA
)
∪ Reach({s′ ∈ SSout | w[S ′] ∈ δS(s′)}) (1)
from s, where Reach(. . .) indicates a reachability objective. That is, Eve should play such
that every play either leaves via an output node with an adequate value, or should prevent
each suspect player to achieve his/her objective.
The value sets can be computed for parity conditions:
I Lemma 14. When each payoffA is a Boolean payoff function given by a a parity condition,7
one can compute in exponential space value(s) for every s ∈ SEve \ S⊥.
Proof. The condition (1) corresponds to a so-called generalized (conjunctive) parity condi-
tion. Thanks to [16], the winner of a generalized conjunctive parity games can be established
in coNP. It can in particular be solved in polynomial space.
Starting from the smallest sets S, we fill in exponential space a table with input a state s
of EG and a subset S ′ of the set S = susp(s), and with output 1 or 0, depending on whether
Eve has a winning strategy for condition (1). Each computation can be done in exponential
space. So globally, this can be done in exponential space. J
To conclude, we can state the following result:
6 This is a notation for the vector assigning 1 to every A ∈ S.
7 We assume the reader is familiar with parity conditions...
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I Corollary 15. One can decide in exponential space the (constrained) existence of a Nash
equilibrium in a game with public signal and publicly visible payoff functions associated with
parity conditions.
Proof. We fix two thresholds (νA)A∈P and (ν′A)A∈P for the payoff.
Once all the sets value(s) for every s ∈ SEve \ S⊥ have been computed (in exponential
space thanks to Lemma 14), we can do the following: for each payoff vector (pA)A∈P which
satisfies νA ≤ pA ≤ ν′A for every A ∈ P , first mark all states s such that p ∈ value(s), and
then look for a ⊥-play which satisfies the constraint ΩA if pA = 1 and ΩcA if pA = 0, and
only traverses Adam-states where each deviation to a state s is marked. This can be done
in exponential space as well. There are at most exponentially many payoff vectors (pA)A∈P
such that νA ≤ pA ≤ ν′A for every A ∈ P , hence this concludes the proof of the result. J
Finally we can state the following result:
I Theorem 16. The constrained existence problem is in EXPSPACE and EXPTIME-hard for
concurrent games with public signal and publicly visible Boolean payoff functions associated
with parity conditions. The lower bound holds even for Büchi conditions and two players.
Proof. Only the lower bound remains to be proven. We will use a reduction from the halting
problem in an alternating linearly-bounded Turing machine.
LetM be an alternating linearly-bounded Turing machine. Let w be an input word. On
reading w, the tape will be bounded by p(|w|), where p is a polynom. W.l.o.g. we rewrite w
into a length-p(|w|) (completing with #), and assume it is w itself. We build a two-player
turn-based game GM, which will simulate the computation of M on w. It is constructued
as follows:
Initial state (q0, 0, w(0)) (belongs to Adam)
M is in cell 0 and contains the letter w(0)
For all j ∈ {0, . . . , p(|w|)}, (q0, 0, w(0))
aj,w(j)−−−−→ (test, q0, 0, w(0), (j, w(j))) and `(aj,w(j), ?) =
start; State (test, q0, 0, w(0), (j, w(j))) belongs to Adam
With that transition, Adam decides to monitor cell j, and stores the fact that it contains initially
w(j). This is invisible to player Eve, who therefore will not know what Adam is monitoring. Note
that we did not check here that w(j) = w(0) whenever j = 0; this will done in the next state.
(test, q, i, α, (j, β)) continue−−−−−→ (q, i, α, (j, β)) if either i 6= j or i = j and α = β.
(test, q, i, α, (j, β)) failure−−−−→ fail if i = j but α 6= β
We set `(continue, ?) = continue and `(failure, ?) = failure.
This is a test which can fail whenever Adam is monitoring the current cell, and realizes that what
Eve claims for that cell is not correct.
State (q, i, α, (j, β)) belongs to either Eve or Adam, depending on whether q is ∨ or ∧.
This is standard alternation between Eve who tries to find the correct next operation and Adam
who tries to find the worst operation.
For every state (q, i, α, (j, β)) (which belongs either to Eve or to Adam), for every transition
t = (q, α, α′, q′, d) such that 0 ≤ i + d ≤ p(|w|), there is a transition (q, i, α, (j, β)) t−→
(t, q, i, α, (j, β)); `(t, ?) = t and this last state belongs to Eve. If there is no such transition
then there is a transition (q, i, α, (j, β)) failure−−−−→ fail.
The next move, when it exists, is stored in the state.
Writing t = (q, α, α′, q′, d), for every α′′ ∈ Σ, (t, q, i, α, (j, β)) α
′′
−−→ (test, q′, i+d, α′′, (j, β))
if j 6= i, and (t, q, i, α, (j, β)) α
′′
−−→ (test, q′, i+ d, α′′, (j, α′)) if j = i. We set `(α′′, ?) = α′′.
Patricia Bouyer 23
This is the next move computation. This is where Eve has to be smart, since she has to remember
what was in cell i + d (this α′′)! Note that Adam updates his knowledge about the cell he is
monitoring...
Note: in the above game, even though the public signal hides some information, Adam has
full information, since all hidden decisions have been made by him.
The payoff function for Eve is given by the reachability condition “Reach the halting
state”, and it is the converse for Adam. Then one can then prove the following equivalence
between the Turing machine M and the constructed game: M halts on w if and only if
there is a Nash equilibrium in GM from the initial state where Eve wins. J
Going further.
In this section we have only considered Boolean ω-regular prefix-independent payoff func-
tions. We easily see that we can twist Lemma 12 for, e.g. reachability properties, and obtain
a very similar algorithm for Boolean payoff functions associated with reachability conditions.
We can even twist it further to mix prefix-independent objectives and reachability objectives.
We will not detail that here.
Somewhat more importantly, we could well extend the generic approach to the so-called
ordered objectives of [9]. They are somehow finite preference relations (extending payoff
functions as given here) manipulating ω-regular properties: for instance, given a finite num-
ber of ω-regular properties, the “maximise” order counts the number of objectives which are
satisfied.
Finally let us comment on the public visibility of payoff functions. While it is important
for quantitative objectives like mean payoff objectives (remember the undecidability result of
Theorem 5), it is not so important for Boolean objectives. Indeed we can enrich the epistemic
game with extra information tracking enough information about the past for easily checking
many properties in parallel. We believe we can enrich the construction and provide an
algorithm to decide the constrained existence problem for Boolean ω-regular invisible payoff
functions.
4.4 Mean payoff objectives
In this section, we assume that each payoff payoffA in G is given by a (liminf or limsup) mean
payoff function MPA that is publicly visible through the labelling `: for every A ∈ P , there
is a function wA : Σ→ Z such that, if R = v0 ·m1 · v1 . . .mk · vk . . . is a full play of G, then
payoffA(R) = lim supk→∞ 1k
∑k
i=1 wA(`(mi, vi)) if MPA is a limsup mean payoff function
and payoffA(R) = lim infk→∞ 1k
∑k
i=1 wA(`(mi, vi)) if MPA is a liminf mean payoff function.
Quickly notice that the new payoff functions payoff′A used in EG are also (liminf or limsup)
mean payoff functions, but since each single step in G is mimicked by two steps in EG , the
corresponding weight functions needs to be doubled. This will appear in the transformation
below.
First notice that we could have used the generic approach for this problem as well and
apply various results of [12, 13], but it is actually easier to follow the approach of [11], and
to transform the winning condition of Eve in EG directly to a so-called polyhedron query in
a multi-dimensional mean-payoff game.
To ease the notations, we write P = {Ai | 1 ≤ i ≤ |P |}. We also denote by W the
maximal absolute weight appearing in G. We first define several weight functions. For each
1 ≤ i ≤ |P |, we define:
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for every edge e =
(
s
M−→ (s,M)
)
in EG , we set wi(e) = w|P |+i(e) = w2|P |+i(e) = 0
for every edge e =
(
(s,M) β−→ s′) in EG with s′(⊥) 6= ∅, we set:
wi(e) = 2wAi(β)
w|P |+i(e) = −2wAi(β)
w2|P |+i(e) = −2wAi(β)
for every edge e =
(
(s,M) β−→ s′) in EG with s′(⊥) = ∅, we set:
wi(e) = 2W
w|P |+i(e) = 2W
w2|P |+i(e) =
{ −2wAi(β) if Ai ∈ susp(s)
2W otherwise
For every i, we write MP−1i for MPi and MP+1i for MPi, where the weight taken into
account is wi. We also write ι(i) = +1 if MPAi is a limsup mean payoff and ι(i) = −1 if
MPAi is a liminf meanpayoff.
We now show that the winning condition of Eve in EG can be expressed using these new
mean payoff functions.
I Lemma 17. Eve has a winning strategy in EG from s0 for payoff vector p = (pA)A∈P if
and only if Eve has a strategy σEve from s0 such that for every R ∈ out(σEve, s0):
MPι(i)i (R) ≥ pAi
MP−ι(i)|P |+i(R) ≥ −pAi
MP−ι(i)2|P |+i(R) ≥ −pAi
Proof. Pick a winning strategy σEve for Eve in EG from s0, for payoff p = (pA)A∈P . In
particular, payoff′(out⊥(σEve, s0)) = p, and for all R ∈ out(σEve, s0), for every A ∈ susp(R),
payoff′A(R) ≤ pA. We will show that p satisfies the constraints in the statement.
Consider first R = out⊥(σEve, s0). For every Ai ∈ P , payoff′Ai(R) = pAi . By definition of
the weights in the ⊥-part of the game, we get payoff′Ai(R) = MPι(i)i (R) = −MP−ι(i)|P |+i(R) =
−MP−ι(i)2|P |+i(R); hence MPι(i)i (R) ≥ pAi , MP−ι(i)|P |+i(R) ≥ −pAi and MP−ι(i)2|P |+i(R) ≥ −pAi .
Consider now R ∈ out(σEve, s0)\{out⊥(σEve, s0)}. For every Ai ∈ susp(R), payoff′Ai(R) ≤
pAi ; there is no constraint on payoff′Ai(R) when Ai /∈ susp(R). By definition of the weights
in the game:
MPι(i)i (R) = MP
−ι(i)
i (R) = W , hence MP
ι(i)
i (R) ≥ pAi (since pAi is a mean payoff value
in G, hence it is bounded by W );
MPι(i)|P |+i(R) = MP
−ι(i)
|P |+i(R) = W , hence MP
−ι(i)
|P |+i(R) ≥ −pAi ;
if Ai /∈ susp(R), MPι(i)2|P |+i(R) = MP−ι(i)2|P |+i(R) = W , hence MP−ι(i)2|P |+i(R) ≥ −pAi ;
if Ai ∈ susp(R), payoff′Ai(R) = −MP−ι(i)2|P |+i(R) ≤ pAi ; hence MP−ι(i)2|P |+i(R) ≥ −pAi .
It implies that σEve is winning for the new winning condition.
Conversely assume that σEve is winning for the new winning condition. Then consider
R = out⊥(σEve, s0). It holds that payoff′Ai(R) = MP
ι(i)
i (R) = −MP−ι(i)|P |+i(R), hence we get
payoff′Ai(R) = pAi . Pick now R ∈ out(σEve, s0) \ {out⊥(σEve, s0)}, and Ai ∈ susp(R). Then,
payoff′Ai(R) = −MP−ι(i)2|P |+i(R), hence payoff′Ai(R) ≤ pAi . We conclude that σEve is a winning
strategy for the original objective. J
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For every 1 ≤ i ≤ |P |, M˜Pi is set to MPι(i)i , M˜P|P |+i is set to MP−ι(i)|P |+i and M˜P2|P |+i is
set to MP−ι(i)2|P |+i. Gathering Theorem 11 and Lemma 17, we can characterize the constrained
existence problem for mean payoff functions as follows.
I Corollary 18. Let ν, ν′ ∈ RP . There is a Nash equilibrium in G from v0 with payoff p such
that ν ≤ p ≤ ν′ if and only if there is u = (ui)1≤i≤3|P | ∈ R3|P | such that:
(1) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |P |, ui = −u|P |+i = −u2|P |+i and νi ≤ ui ≤ ν′i;
(2) Eve has a strategy from s0 in EG to ensure M˜Pi ≥ ui for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3|P |.
This above problem is known as the polyhedron problem in [13]. It is shown in this paper
that if there is a solution, there is one solution whose encoding has size polynomial in the
number of dimensions (here 3|P |), the encoding of the polyhedron (here 4|P |), the encoding
of the maximal weight (here, log2(W )) and the encoding of the number of states of the game
(here, O(log2(2|P |·|V | · |Act||P |
2·|V |)), that is = O(|Act| · |P |2 · |V |)). Hence we can guess in
polynomial time a possible encoding for such a solution u, check in polynomial time that it
belongs to the polyhedron, and use an oracle to decide whether Eve is winning in this game.
We can apply results of [37] (which show that multi-dimensional mean-payoff games can be
solved in coNP) to infer that this can be done in coNEXPTIME (since EG has exponential-size
and new weights have polynomial encodings). Globally, everything can therefore be done in
exponential space. We therefore deduce the following result.
I Theorem 19. The constrained existence problem is in NPNEXPTIME (hence in EXPSPACE)
and EXPTIME-hard for concurrent games with public signal and publicly visible mean payoff
functions.
The lower bound uses the result for Boolean objectives stated in Theorem 16.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied concurrent games with imperfect monitoring modelled using
signals. We have given some undecidability results, even in the case of public signals,
when the payoff functions are not publicly visible. We have then proposed a construction
to capture single-player deviations in games with public signals, and reduced the search of
Nash equilibria to the synthesis of winning strategies in a two-player turn-based games (with
a rather complex winning condition though). We have applied this general framework to
two classes of payoff functions, and obtained decidability results.
As further work we wish to understand better if there could be richer communication pat-
terns which would allow representable knowledge structures for Nash equilibria and thereby
the synthesis of Nash equilibria under imperfect monitoring. A source of inspiration for
further work will be [28].
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A Why players should distinguish the actions they played
In this paper, to model the perfect-recall hypothesis, we define the undistinguishability
relation ∼A of player A using projection piA, which includes private actions of player A
and the signal. Standardly though (see e.g. [36, 5, 22]), the undistinguishability relation is
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defined using solely the signal (hence forgetting private actions). While this does not affect
the recall for distributed synthesis (existence of a strategy for the grand coalition), nor for
Nash equilibria (existence of a strategy profile as well), we believe this is important for more
complex interactions between players (for instance for multi-agent logics like in [3]).
We will argue this point using subgame-perfect equilibria. Those are strategy profiles
for which, for any history (generated or not by the main profile), the strategy profile after
that history is a Nash equilibrium. Consider the game represented below, with Boolean
objectives as indicated, and where vertices v2 and v3 cannot be distinguished by any of the
two players
v0 v1 winning for A1, losing for A2
v2
v3
v4 winning for A1, losing for A2
v5 losing for A1 winning for A2
v6 losing for A1, winning for A2
v7 winning for A1, losing for A2
〈a,a〉,〈b,a〉
〈a,b〉
〈a,−〉
〈b,−〉
〈b,b〉 〈a,−〉
〈b,−〉
The strategy profile σP represented in bold red, and defined by σP (v0) = 〈a, a〉, σP (v0 ·
〈a, b〉 · v2) = 〈a,−〉 and σP (v0 · 〈b, b〉 · v3) = 〈b,−〉, is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in our
framework. Indeed, player A1 distinguishes the two histories v0 · 〈a, b〉 · v2 and v0 · 〈b, b〉 · v3,
since she can only be in v2 (resp. v3) if she played a (resp. b). On the other hand, this is not
a proper profile in the standard framework since player A1 is not supposed to distinguish
these histories. We believe this shows that standard assumptions do not properly model
perfect recall.
